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Abstract—This study presents an ANWSER model (asset
network systemic risk model) to quantify the risk of finan-
cial contagion which manifests itself in a financial crisis. The
transmission of financial distress is governed by a heterogeneous
interbank credit network and an investment portfolio of banks.
Bankruptcy reproductive ratio of a financial system is computed
as a function of the diversity and risk exposure of an investment
portfolio of banks, and the denseness and concentration of a
heterogeneous interbank credit network. An analytic solution of
the bankruptcy reproductive ratio for a small financial system is
derived and a numerical solution for a large financial system is
obtained. For a large financial system, large diversity among
banks in the investment portfolio makes financial contagion
more damaging on the average. But large diversity is essentially
effective in eliminating the risk of financial contagion in the worst
case of financial crisis scenarios. A bank-unique specialization
portfolio is more suitable than a uniform diversification portfolio
and a system-wide specialization portfolio in strengthening the
robustness of a financial system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent European sovereign debt crisis has impaired
many European banks. The financial distress on some Euro-
pean banks may transmit to banks in other continents and
cause a catastrophic financial contagion worldwide. Indeed,
more than 10 banks in US, UK, and other countries went
bankrupt in the financial crisis ensuing from the collapse of
the subprime mortgage market in 2007. Since then, supervisors
and other relevant authorities have directed a great effort at
comprehending the systemic risk hidden behind banks and
finding the solution to eliminate financial contagion.
Recently, Monte-Carlo simulation models were developed to
understand the transmission of distress on banks and quantify
the risk of financial contagion[2], [4], [9], [11], [16]. Two
categories of financial distress were studied with the mod-
els. One is a defective investment portfolio of banks which
weakens the robustness of a financial system when the market
prices fluctuate[3]. The other is evaporating solvency of failing
banks in paying off interbank borrowings[5], [7], [12], [14].
Both categories of financial distress transmit simultaneously
in the financial crisis although either category may transmit
separately in the peace time. None of the models address
the compound financial distress of both categories. None of
the models are founded solidly on the stylized facts for the
statistics of the funds transfer between banks[13], [15], [18]
and the process where a bank go bankrupt[8] either. These are
the issues of the models.
This study presents an ANWSER model (asset network
systemic risk model) to quantify the risk of financial conta-
gion in a financial crisis. The ANWSER model analyzes the
transmission of both categories of financial distress. The trans-
mission of financial distress is governed by a heterogeneous
interbank credit network and an investment portfolio of banks.
The ANWSER model computes a bankruptcy reproductive
ratio of a financial system as a function of the diversity
and risk exposure of an investment portfolio of banks, and
the denseness and concentration of a heterogeneous interbank
credit network.
The ANWSER model is described in II, including the
balance sheet of banks, a interbank credit network, an in-
vestment portfolio of banks, the details of a financial crisis
scenario, and the definition of the bankruptcy reproductive
ratio. An analytic solution of the bankruptcy reproductive ratio
for a small financial system is derived in III and a numerical
solution for a large financial system is obtained in IV. Risk
landscape of the bankruptcy reproductive ratio is drawn on
the plane of the diversity and risk exposure of an investment
portfolio of banks. The risk landscape can be a basic compass
tool in searching for the optimal portfolio which strengthens
the robustness of a financial system.
II. ANWSER MODEL
A. Balance sheet
The balance sheet of a bank is represented by a set of five
quantities in the ANWSER model. The amount of asset of the
n-th bank is an. The number of banks is N (1 ≤ n ≤ N ).
The asset include external assets ei and interbank loans ln.
The external asset is an investment in general. The total
amount of interbank loans is given by L =
∑N
n=1 ln. The
liability includes equity capital cn, interbank borrowings bn,
and deposits dn. The equity capital means the core tier 1
capital including common stock and disclosed reserves. These
need not be paid off and can be used to absorb the loss from
the distress immediately. An interbank borrowing of one bank
is an interbank loan of other bank. Fig.1 shows the balance
sheet.
Fig. 1. Balance sheet of the n-th bank in the ANWSER model.
The interbank loan ratio θ of the financial system is defined
by Eq.(1).
θ =
L∑N
n=1 an
. (1)
The equity capital ratio γ of individual banks is defined by
Eq.(2).
γn =
cn
an
. (2)
It is assumed in this study that big banks and small banks
have the same equity capital ratio. This value, γ, is the minimal
level of the equity capital ratio required by the bank regulatory
policies.
B. interbank credit network
An interbank loan is the credit relation between a creditor
bank and a debtor bank which appears when the debtor bank
raises money in the interbank market. A interbank credit
network describes the all credit relations. It is a directed
graph which consists of banks as vertices, and the interbank
loans as edges from creditor banks to debtor banks. The
interbank credit network is specified by an N × N matrix
T in the ANWSER model. If the n-th bank lends n′-th
bank, Tnn′ = 1 and 0 otherwise. The outgoing degree of
the n-th bank is the number of banks which it lends. It is
calculated by koutn =
∑N
n′=1 Tnn′ . The incoming degree is
the number of banks from which it borrows. It is calculated
by kinn′ =
∑N
n=1 Tnn′ .
It is found from the studies on the statistics of some
electronic funds transfer system like BOJ-Net in Japan[18],
Fedwire in US[15], CHAPS in UK[13], and e-MID in Italy[17]
that the distribution of the degree of banks obeys a power
law. And more importantly, the amount of funds transferred
between banks increases as a power of their degrees. It is
assumed in the ANWSER model that the generalized law in
eq.(3) holds. The amount of an interbank loan from the n-th
bank to the n′-th bank is wnn′ [1].
wnn′ =
Tnn′ (k
out
n k
in
n′)
r∑
n6=n′ Tnn′ (k
out
n k
in
n′)
r
L. (3)
In the ANWSER model, the parameter r ≥ 0 governs the
heterogeneity of the distribution of interbank loans over the
interbank credit network. The amount of interbank loans is
constant if r = 0. The distribution becomes more heteroge-
neous as r increases. Given T and r, the amount of interbank
loans and borrowings of individual banks is determined by
eq.(4) and (5).
ln =
∑
n′ 6=n
wnn′ . (4)
bn′ =
∑
n6=n′
wnn′ . (5)
Given θ, the amount of external assets is determined by
eq.(6). A prerequisite that the external assets are no less than
the net interbank borrowings is imposed because the bank has
already gone bankruptcy if this prerequisite is not satisfied.
en = max(bn − ln, 0) + (
1− θ
θ
L−
N∑
n=1
max(bn − ln, 0))
ln
L
.
(6)
Given γ, cn = γ(en + ln) and dn = (en + ln)− (cn + bn).
The value of the five quantities in the balance sheet in II-A is
determined.
Two macroscopic indices are defined to summarize the
denseness and concentration of a interbank credit network.
The average degree κ is defined by eq.(7). 0 < κ ≤ N − 1 is
satisfied. A more dense interbank credit network has a larger
value of κ. It is a function of T .
κ(T ) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
n6=n′
Tnn′ . (7)
The share ρ5 of the largest five banks in the interbank loans
is defined by eq.(8). Here, n1 refers to the bank which owns
the largest amount of interbank loans, n1 = argmaxn(ln),
and ni refers to the bank which owns the i-th largest interbank
loans. 0 ≤ ρ5 ≤ 1 holds. A more concentrated interbank credit
network has a larger value of ρ5. The index ρ5 is an increasing
function of r.
ρ5(r) =
∑
n=n1,n2,n3,n4,n5
ln∑N
n=1 ln
. (8)
C. Investment portfolio
The external assets of a bank are the investment in assets
like securities and government bonds. Xnm is the amount of
the m-th asset as a fraction of the external assets which the
n-th bank invests. The number of assets is M (1 ≤ m ≤M ).∑M
m=1Xnm = 1 for any n and 0 ≤ Xnm ≤ 1 are satisfied.
The investment portfolio is specified by an N ×M matrix X
in the ANWSER model.
Two macroscopic indices are defined to summarize the
diversity and risk exposure of the investment portfolio[3]. The
index δ is the average difference in the fractions between
banks, Xnm − Xn′m. It is defined by eq.(9). The relation
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is satisfied. A more diverse investment portfolio
has a larger value of δ. It is a function of X .
δ(X) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
n6=n′
1
M
M∑
m=1
|Xnm −Xn′m|. (9)
The index ε is the average difference between Xnm and
1/M . Xnm = 1/M for any m means uniform diversification
portfolio whose risk tends to be the smallest. The index ε is
defined by eq.(9). The relation 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 is satisfied. A more
risk-exposed investment portfolio has a larger value of ε.
ε(X) =
1
N
M∑
m=1
|
N∑
n=1
Xnm −
1
M
|. (10)
In case of a uniform diversification portfolio where Xnm =
1/M , δ = 0 and ε = 0. A bank-unique specialization portfolio
means that individual banks invest in their own unique assets,
XnmU(n) = 1. Generally, mU(n) 6= mU(n′) if n 6= n′. In
this case, δ = 1 and ε = 0. A system-wide specialization
portfolio means that any banks invest in the same mS-th asset,
XnmS = 1. In this case, δ = 0 and ε = 1.
D. Financial crisis scenario
The trigger of the financial crisis in the ANWSER model
is the fluctuation of the market prices of the assets. The fall
in the market price of the unit quantity of the m-th asset
is denoted by vm. The loss which the n-th bank incurs is
en
∑M
m=1Xnmvm. If this loss can not be absorbed by the
equity capital, the bank goes bankrupt. The set of banks which
go bankrupt in this initial stage is denoted by F 0. It is given
by eq.(11).
F 0 = {n|cn < en
M∑
m=1
Xnmvm}. (11)
In the next stage, the insolvency of banks in F 0 causes
additional loss to the bank which lends any banks in F 0. Any
portions of the interbank loan are not paid off. If the total
loss can not be absorbed by the equity capital, the bank goes
bankrupt too. This is the transmission of financial distress and
the basic mechanism of financial contagion. The set of banks
which go bankrupt in this stage is denoted by F 1. Similarly,
this process goes on working many times until the financial
contagion comes to a halt in the final stage. The set of banks
which go bankrupt in the j-th stage F j is given by eq.(12).
F j = {n|cn < en
M∑
m=1
Xnmvm +
∑
n′∈F j−1
lnn′}. (12)
Formally, the set of banks which ended in bankruptcy in
any stages is given by F∞ =
⋃
j F j .
E. Bankruptcy reproductive ratio
The ANWSER model computes the bankruptcy reproduc-
tive ratio A. This quantifies the strength of a susequent chain
effect as a measure of the risk of financial contagion. A is
defined by eq.(13), which is the ratio of the final number of
bankruptcies after the financial contagion to the initial number
of bankruptcies immediately after the market prices fluctuate.
It is a function of the macroscopic indices κ and ρ5 for a
interbank credit network in II-B, and δ and ε for an investment
portfolio of banks in II-C.
A(κ, ρ5, δ, ε) =
|F∞|
|F 0|
(13)
When A = 1, financial contagion does not appear. As the
value of A increases, the financial contagion becomes more
damaging. A(δ, ε) for given κ and ρ5 is called a risk landscape.
III. ANALYTIC SOLUTION FOR N = 2
A. Exact formula
The ANWSER model in II can be solved analytically for a
small financial system. The exact formula for the bankruptcy
reproductive ratio is derived for N = 2 and M = 2. Both
banks have the same amount of asset a. Both are creditors
and debtors. The balance sheet becomes l1 = b2 = θa, b1 =
l2 = θa, e1 = e2 = (1 − θ)a, c1 = c2 = γa, and d1 = d2 =
(1 − γ − θ)a. The fall in the market prices is a probability
variable. It is assumed that v1 and v2 are independent and
obey an exponential distribution in eq.(14).
P (vm) =
{
λ
2 e
λvm if vm ≤ 0
λ
2 e
−λvm if vm > 0
. (14)
Eq.(11) can be converted to the criterion for banks going
bankrupt on the asset price plane (v1, v2). Fig.2 shows the
criterion. No banks go bankrupt in the domain Ψ0. Either of
the two banks goes bankrupt in Ψ1. Both banks go bankrupt in
Ψ2. The boundaries Φ1 and Φ2 determine whether individual
banks go bankrupt or not. They are given by eq.(15).{
Φ1 : γ = (1− θ){X11v1 + (1 −X11)v2}
Φ2 : γ = (1− θ){X21v1 + (1 −X21)v2}
. (15)
The probability of two banks going bankrupt is given by
eq.(16) where Λ = γλ/(1− θ).
p(|F 0| = 2) =
∫∫
Ψ2
P (v1)P (v2)dv1dv2
= −
(X11 − 1)
2
2(2X11 − 1)
e
Λ
X11−1 +
X221
2(2X21 − 1)
e
− Λ
X21
−
1
4
(
X11 − 1
2X11 − 1
−
X21 − 1
2X21 − 1
)e−2Λ. (16)
The probability of one bank going bankrupt is given by
eq.(17).
p(|F 0| = 1) =
∫∫
Ψ1
P (v1)P (v2)dv1dv2
=
(X11 − 1)
2
2(2X11 − 1)
e
Λ
X11−1 +
X211
2(2X11 − 1)
e−
Λ
X11
−
(X21 − 1)
2
2(2X21 − 1)
e
Λ
X21−1 −
X221
2(2X21 − 1)
e
− Λ
X21
+
1
2
(
X11 − 1
2X11 − 1
−
X21 − 1
2X21 − 1
)e−2Λ. (17)
The probability of no banks going bankrupt is given by
eq.(18).
p(|F 0| = 0) =
∫∫
Ψ0
P (v1)P (v2)dv1dv2
= −
X211
2(2X11 − 1)
e−
Λ
X11 +
(X21 − 1)
2
2(2X21 − 1)
e
Λ
X21−1
−
1
4
(
X11 − 1
2X11 − 1
−
X21 − 1
2X21 − 1
)e−2Λ + 1. (18)
Fig. 2. Criterion for banks going bankrupt for N = 2 and M = 2 on the
asset price plane (v1, v2). The boundaries Φ1 and Φ2 determine whether the
two banks go bankrupt. None go bankrupt in the domain Ψ0. Either of the
two goes in Ψ1. Both go in Ψ2.
Eq.(12) can be converted to the criterion for financial
contagion on the asset price plane. Fig.3 shows the criterion.
If one bank goes bankrupt, the other bank goes bankrupt too
in the domain ΨC. The boundaries of ΨC are Φ1, Φ2, and
ΦC. ΦC is given by eq.(19).
ΦC :


γ = min((1− θ){X21v1 + (1 −X21)v2} − γ, θ)
+(1− θ){X11v1 + (1−X11)v2} if v1 ≤
γ
1−θ
γ = min((1− θ){X11v1 + (1 −X11)v2} − γ, θ)
+(1− θ){X21v1 + (1−X21)v2} if v1 >
γ
1−θ
.
(19)
The probability of financial contagion is given by eq.(20).
The exact formula for eq.(20) can be derived although it is
complicated.
p(|F 0| = 1, |F 1| = 2) =
∫∫
ΨC
P (v1)P (v2)dv1dv2. (20)
The exact formula for the bankruptcy reproductive ratio is
derived from the probabilities in eq.(16) through (20) although
it is also complicated. For M = 2, δ = |X11 − X21|,
ε = |X11 + X21 − 1|, and 0 ≤ δ + ε ≤ 1 are satisfied. The
bankruptcy reproductive ratio is obtained as a function of δ
and ε, as well as a function of X11 and X21. This is the risk
landscape A(δ, ε).
B. Risk landscape
Fig.4 shows the risk landscape A(δ, ε) which is measured
at the average point of the number of bankruptcies. The
value of λ in eq.(14) is adjusted so that the probability of
bankruptcy of an individual bank having γ = 0.07 can be
10−3. The bankruptcy reproductive ratio becomes large when
the value of δ is 0.2 through 0.4. Although the condition under
which the risk of financial contagion vanishes (A = 1) is not
obtained analytically, Fig.4 demonstrates that large diversity
among banks in the investment portfolio reduces the risk of
financial contagion. A bank-unique specialization portfolio is
Fig. 3. Criterion for financial contagion for N = 2 and M = 2 on the asset
price plane (v1, v2). If one bank went bankrupt, the other bank goes bankrupt
too in the domain ΨC. The boundaries of ΨC are Φ1, Φ2, and ΦC.
Fig. 4. Risk landscape derived analytically by the ANWSER model. The
bankruptcy reproductive ratio A is drawn as a function of the diversity δ and
risk exposure ε when θ = 0.1 and γ = 0.05 for N = 2 and M = 2. The
ratio is measured at the average point of the number of bankruptcies.
more suitable than a uniform diversification portfolio and a
system-wide specialization in strengthening the robustness of
a finacial system.
Fig.5 shows A(δ, ε) which is measured at the 999th 1000-
quantile point. The bankruptcy reproductive ratio is either 1 or
2. Financial contagion disappears when δ > 0.6. Again, large
diversity reduces the risk of financial contagion. Small risk
exposure is also relevant in eliminating the financial contagion.
IV. NUMERICAL SOLUTION FOR N = 500
A. Simulation experiment
The ANWSER model in II can be solved numerically with a
Monte-Carlo simulation technique for a large financial system.
Given κ and ρ5, a number of samples for a heterogeneous
interbank credit network T are generated randomly. Fig.6
shows an example of a heterogeneous interbank credit network
when N = 500. The network is a generalized Baraba´si-Albert
Fig. 5. Risk landscape derived analytically by the ANWSER model. The
bankruptcy reproductive ratio A is drawn as a function of the diversity δ and
risk exposure ε when θ = 0.1 and γ = 0.05 for N = 2 and M = 2. The
ratio is measured at the 999th 1000-quantile point (the worst case) of the
number of bankruptcies.
Fig. 6. Heterogeneous interbank credit network for N = 500. The size
of a vertex represents the amount of asset of a bank. The width of an edge
represents the amount of an interbank loan between the banks at its ends.
model[19], [20]. This is a random graph with the mechanism
of growth and preferential attachment, which becomes scale-
free as N goes to infinity, that is, the distribution of the degree
k obeys the power law, P (k) ∝ k−α where α ≥ 2. There is a
significant probability of the presence of very big banks. This
is the origin of heterogeneity.
Given δ and ε, a number of samples for an investment
portfolio X are generated randomly. It is assumed that the
fall in the market prices vm are independent and obey a
Student t-distribution whose degree of freedom is 1.5. This
is a long-tailed distribution. It is suitable to describe a sudden
large fluctuation of market prices. A number of samples for
vm are generated randomly. The number of bankruptcies at
the average point and the 999th 1000-quantile point can be
obtained from the frequency distribution of those samples.
Fig. 7. Risk landscape obtained numerically by the ANWSER model. The
bankruptcy reproductive ratio A is drawn as a function of the diversity δ and
risk exposure ε when θ = 0.1, γ = 0.07, K = 25, and ρ5 = 0.25 for
N = 500 and M = 2. The ratio is measured at the average point of the
number of bankruptcies.
B. Risk landscape
Fig.7 shows the risk landscape A(δ, ε) which is measured
at the average point of the number of bankruptcies. The
conditions N = 500, κ = 25, and ρ5 = 0.25 are equivalent to
those for BOJ-Net. The bankruptcy reproductive ratio becomes
larger as δ approaches 1. The largest value of A is 1.9. This
landscape is quite different from that in Fig.4. Risk exposure
does not have a strong impact on the bankruptcy reproductive
ratio.
Fig.8 shows A(δ, ε) which is measured at the 999th 1000-
quantile point. The bankruptcy reproductive ratio becomes
quite large when the value of δ is 0.2. The largest value of A
is 4.4. Large diversity among banks in the investment portfolio
reduces the risk of financial contagion essentially. The results
are striking. Large diversity among banks makes financial
contagion more damaging on the average. A uniform diver-
sification portfolio and a system-wide specialization portfolio
are more suitable than a bank-unique specialization portfolio.
But large diversity is essentially effective in eliminating the
risk of financial contagion in the worst case of financial
crisis scenarios. A bank-unique specialization portfolio is more
suitable than a uniform diversification portfolio and a system-
wide specialization portfolio in strengthening the robustness
of a financial system.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the lessons of the financial crisis in 2007 is that
supervisors and other relevant authorities failed to capture the
systemic risk hidden behind banks just by keeping a close eye
on individual banks and economic fundamentals. The scope
of the recent arguments on the capital surcharge is still the re-
silience of individual global systemically important banks. The
analysis with the ANWSER model, however, demonstrates that
the risk of financial contagion depends on the macroscopic
Fig. 8. Risk landscape obtained numerically by the ANWSER model. The
bankruptcy reproductive ratio A is drawn as a function of the diversity δ and
risk exposure ε when θ = 0.1, γ = 0.07, K = 25, and ρ5 = 0.25 for
N = 500 and M = 2. The ratio is measured at the 999th 1000-quantile
point (the worst case) of the number of bankruptcies.
indices, diversity and risk exposure of an investment portfolio
of banks. Large diversity is essentially effective in eliminating
the risk of financial contagion in the worst case of financial
crisis scenarios. A bank-unique specialization portfolio is more
suitable than a uniform diversification portfolio and a system-
wide specialization portfolio. These results form the basis for
an effective design principle for supervisors and other relevant
authorities in making bank regulatory policies to strengthen the
robustness of a financial system.
The ANWSER model will be extended to address a more
practical finance system. The model will include settlement
dates (overnight, short-term, or long-term) of interbank loans,
withdrawal and netting of interbank loans, refinancing and
other means to raise money, liquidity of assets, correlation
between the market prices of assets, and other market mech-
anisms. The bank run in a fractional reserve banking when
a financial crisis precipitates a banking panic is also of
interest as a topic for future works. The market price of
an external asset is a linear combination of independent and
identically distributed probability variables. If the number of
assets increases, the price is less volatile, the loss which a bank
incurs in the initial stage is less fluctuating, and the number of
bankruptcies tends to decrease. But it is not evident whether
the number of assets has a big impact on the bankruptcy
reproductive ratio and the risk landscape. This topic is also
for future works.
Another issue is that the interbank credit network and the
investment porfolio are not static in reality and can not be
observed directly either. In the study of epidemic contagion
in social network analysis, the transportation network and
relevant parameters are inferred from the observation on the
number of patients with a statistical analysis[6], [10]. Then, an
impending epidemic outbreak may be predicted with a Monte-
Carlo simulation technique. Similarly, the prediction of the
risk of a financial system may be founded on the facts which
are obtained by observing individual banks and inferring the
interbank credit network and the investment porfolio. Such
prediction aids the supervisors and other relevant authorities
in designing the financial system theoretically and in making
regulatory policies in practice. This is the goal of an emerging
field of systems economics.
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